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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for uttering a forged 
prescription, a thii: d degree felony, ii 1 violation 01 Ucah Code 
AnTlt § 58-37-8(4) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1995) . This Court has 
jurisdiction, over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
i I i i i I I I in ! i i i II " r ^  < I ' • 'i""j| ' • i m i n ^ I h a l i II i in MI II -
expert witness whose familiarity w;*\ defendant's handwriting was 
not acquis- -or purposes of __ .ligation could authenticate 
defendant's handwriting pursuant to 4-ujLe : 
Evidence? 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES, 
D efendan t/App e11ant. 
The trial court's determination of whether a witness is 
qualified to testify under rule 901(b)(2) presents a legal 
question. Nonetheless, in reviewing this question, the appellate 
court should grant the trial court a considerable "measure of 
discretion" because of the highly fact-dependent nature of the 
determination. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994). 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict? 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 901, governing the requirement of 
authentication or identification, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General provision. The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what 
its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration 
only, and not by way of limitation, the 
2 
following are examples of authentication or 
identification conforming with the 
requirements of this rule: 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on 
handwriting • Nonexper*- opinion as 
to the genuineness of handwriting, 
based upon familiarity not acquired 
for purposes of the litigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of 
uttering a forged prescription, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(4) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1995) (R. 239). After prevailing on a 
motion to suppress the eyewitness identification testimony of 
three witnesses, defendant, acting pro se, was tried before a 
jury and convicted as charged (R. 304-05). He then filed this 
timely appeal (R. 311). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 27, 1994, a black man entered the Art City 
Pharmacy in Springville and presented a prescription to be filled 
for "James Brooks" for "Percoceth," signed by "Dr. Darrel Olsen" 
(Tr. of 3/14/95 at 29, 42, 44; addendum A). Employee Vallorie 
Seitz, suspicious of the misspelling of the drug Percocet, 
alerted the pharmacist, who apparently called the police (Tr. 44-
45). Before the police arrived, however, the man left the 
pharmacy. 
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According to another pharmacy employee, the man drove off in 
a small, compact, cherry red sports car (Tr. 49). The employee, 
presented at trial with two photos of a red Mazda MX-3 sports car 
owned by defendant, agreed that the photos were consistent with 
the vehicle he had observed driving away from the pharmacy (Tr. 
51, 53) . 
Dr. Darrel Olsen, whose signature appeared on the 
prescription, did not sign the prescription, nor had he 
authorized anyone else to do so for him (Tr. 29). Dr. Olsen 
noted that prescription forms were routinely left in examination 
rooms in the clinics where he practiced, and that patients were 
often left unsupervised in those rooms (Tr. 32). 
Dr. Kim Bateman, Olsen's partner, corroborated that the 
prescription forms were readily accessible to patients. Dr. 
Bateman had seen defendant as a patient on September 26, 1994, 
the day before the forged prescription was tendered at Art City 
Pharmacy (Tr. 70, 72). Prior to being examined by Dr. Bateman, 
defendant was left unsupervised in an examination room (Tr. 73). 
Although defendant did not testify, he produced a writing 
sample under court order in the presence of a law enforcement 
officer (Tr. 54, 65, 66; addendum B). The State contended that 
defendant had tried to disguise his normal handwriting in the 
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sample and so produced a witness to authenticate other documents 
in defendant's handwriting for purposes of comparison with the 
Percocet prescription (Tr. 85, 94-95; addendum C). 
Sherry Ragan, a deputy Utah County attorney, initially 
testified outside the presence of the jury.1 She had become 
familiar with defendant's handwriting, both from letters he had 
written to her and from pro se motions he had filed in the course 
of previous litigation (Tr. 80-81). 
Ragan first authenticated a letter defendant had written to 
her, observing that she had received it from defendant and that 
the content as well as the handwriting indicated that it was from 
him (Tr. 78, 81-82). Ragan then examined a letter written to 
David Cole, prosecutor in this case, and an envelope, also 
addressed to Cole. She recognized the handwriting on both 
documents as defendant's (Tr. 82-83). She also authenticated 
several other handwritten court documents filed by defendant (Tr. 
83-84) . 
1
 Defendant objected to her testimony as prejudicial, 
arguing that a jury was likely to infer past criminal behavior 
from the fact of his correspondence with a prosecutor. 
Accordingly, the trial court recessed the jury prior to hearing 
from Ragan. The court explained that it could thus consider the 
admissibility of Ragan's testimony as a matter of law under rule 
901 without risking prejudice to defendant (Tr. 78). 
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The trial court then ruled: "Under rule 901, Ms. Ragan is a 
competent lay person who can give a non-expert opinion of 
handwriting7' (Tr. 91) . The court supported its ruling with oral 
findings of fact: 
I find that the circumstances which guarantee 
trustworthiness that these were written by 
you, the fact that they purported to give a 
recitation of events that occurred and came 
from an address that you were currently 
residing in, and that you addressed them to 
the court in some instances while 
representing yourself, and filed them with 
the court, then [sic] came from the address 
of the defendant, I think that it is 
reasonable that the circumstances of 
trustworthiness and circumstances guarantee 
that these are reasonably calculated to be 
trustworthy evidences of the defendant's 
handwriting. And so I will receive them. 
(Tr. 95).2 
The jury returned to the courtroom, and the State called its 
handwriting expert. The expert explained that 10-20 "points of 
identification" between a questioned handwriting sample and a 
sample known to be written by a particular individual were 
2
 The court explained to defendant that because it had 
determined as a matter of law that the authenticated documents 
were written by defendant, there would be no need to call Ragan 
as a witness before the jury unless defendant questioned the 
validity of the authentication by denying that he wrote the 
documents (Tr. 103-07). Defendant subsequently raised the issue, 
and Ragan, identified before the jury only as a "local attorney," 
testified briefly (Tr. 150-56). 
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necessary to establish a "highly probable or positive" 
identification that the two samples were written by the same 
person (Tr. 116). Because the three documents Ragan 
authenticated as written by defendant had 32 points of 
identification with the forged prescription, the expert concluded 
that they were positively written by the same hand (Tr. 131). 
As to defendant's court-ordered writing sample, the expert 
observed, "I could tell there were definitely some capricious 
changes made. In other words, someone was fooling around with 
their slant and the way that they made things" (Tr. 133). 
Nonetheless, he stated, "We still leave things behind. We still 
leave points. And in going through it, I came up with -- I think 
it was around 18 to 2 0 points that I knew I had from this" (Tr. 
133). He concluded that there was no question in his mind that 
the court-ordered sample and the forged prescription were written 
by the same person (Tr. 134, 148).3 
3
 The handwriting expert's detailed analysis before the 
jury focused on the three documents authenticated by Ragan rather 
than on the court-ordered sample. The expert stated that with 
all of the capricious changes in the court-ordered sample, it was 
easier to explain his technical analysis to lay persons using 
samples of "natural handwriting" (Tr. 134). His choice of 
comparison documents, however, did not detract from his 
unequivocal conclusion that the court-ordered sample was written 
by the same person who wrote the Percocet prescription (Tr. 134, 
148) . 
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Based on this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty, as 
charged, of uttering a forged prescription (R. 270). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing a 
non-expert witness to authenticate documents pursuant to rule 
901(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, because: 1) the witness never 
personally observed defendant write; 2) some of her familiarity 
the defendant's writing was acquired for purposes of this 
litigation; and 3) receipt of more than one letter is necessary 
to establish familiarity under the rule. 
First, neither rule nor case law requires personal 
observation as a condition precedent to admitting testimony about 
the genuineness of handwriting. All that is required is 
"evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(1). 
Second, the witness' familiarity was not acquired for 
purposes of this litigation. Defendant is confusing the 
witness's familiarity with defendant's handwriting gained from 
her past dealings with him in the course of other litigation with 
her authentication of documents that he wrote in the course of 
this litigation. Plainly, the witness was already familiar with 
defendant's handwriting when she authenticated the documents 
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related to this case. 
Third, the degree of familiarity the witness has with 
defendant's handwriting goes to the weight of the evidence, not 
to its admissibility. All that is required for admissibility is 
familiarity sufficient to support a finding that the evidence is 
what the witness claims it is. Once the trial court makes the 
initial legal determination, it is the jury's job to weigh the 
evidence and assess its credibility. 
Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who 
uttered the forged prescription. In essence, he complains that 
there was no direct evidence of his guilt. What he has ignored, 
however, are the many reasonable inferences that the jury could 
have drawn from the evidence before it. When the evidence and 
the inferences are considered, the evidence is not so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to necessarily have 
created reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A 
NON-EXPERT WITNESS, FAMILIAR WITH DEFENDANT'S 
HANDWRITING FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN THIS 
LITIGATION, COULD AUTHENTICATE CERTAIN 
DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 901(b)(2), UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The gist of defendant's argument is that the trial court 
erred by allowing Sherry Ragan to testify as a non-expert witness 
because: 1) she had never personally seen defendant write; 2) 
some of her familiarity with defendant's writing was acquired for 
purposes of this litigation; and 3) receipt of more than one 
letter is necessary in order to establish familiarity with 
handwriting (Br. of App. at 13-14). To support these claims, 
defendant relies on rule 901(b)(2) and on State v. Freshwater, 85 
P. 447 (Utah 1906). 
Defendant's first assertion, that a witness must personally 
see an individual execute at least one writing in order to later 
authenticate another document, is unsupported by either 
Freshwater or rule 901. Freshwater stands for the "well-settled" 
rule "that writing may be proved by evidence of a witness who 
has seen the person write." Freshwater, 85 P. at 448 (emphasis 
added). That is, seeing a person write is one way of 
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establishing a degree of familiarity with that individual's 
handwriting sufficient to allow the authenticating witness's 
testimony to go to the jury. See E. Cleary, McCormick on 
Evidence §221, at 41 (4th ed. 1992)("Adequate familiarity may be 
present if the witness has seen the person write, or if he has 
seen writings purporting to be those of the person in question 
under circumstances indicating their genuineness"). Nowhere in 
Freshwater does the court require personal observation of 
handwriting as a condition precedent to testifying about the 
genuineness of handwriting. 
Nor does rule 901 contemplate the requirement of personal 
observation. See, e.g.. State v. Alson. 461 S.E.2d 687, 704 
(N.C. 1995); People v. Williams. 653 N.E.2d 899, 906 (111. App. 
Ct. 1995); Mackey v. Irisari. 445 S.E.2d 742, 753 (W.Va. 1994). 
Indeed, all rule 901 requires is "evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(a).4 "The rule does not erect a 
particularly high hurdle." United States v. Ortiz. 966 F.2d 707, 
716 ((1st Cir. 1992), cert, denied. 506 U.S. 1063 (1993). 
Certainly, if the framers of the rule had intended a requirement 
4
 Utah's rule 901 is the same as rule 901, Federal Rules of 
Evidence, from which it was plainly derived. 
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of personal observation, they would have explicitly included that 
either in the basic rule or in the illustrative examples. 
Second, defendant claims that Sherry Ragan's familiarity 
with two of the three documents analyzed by the handwriting 
expert was acquired for purposes of this litigation. Therefore, 
he argues, because rule 901(b)(2) requires familiarity "not 
acquired for purposes of the litigation," the trial court erred 
in allowing Ragan to testify (Br. of App. at 14). 
Ragan's familiarity with defendant's handwriting, however, 
was not acquired for purposes of this litigation. To the 
contrary, she acquired her familiarity with his handwriting over 
the course of two prosecutions that occurred sometime during the 
six or seven years preceding this litigation (Tr. 80-82). The 
two documents to which defendant objects, which were written by 
defendant to the prosecutor in this case, were not the basis for 
her familiarity. Rather, she was authenticating that defendant 
wrote them, based on her familiarity with his handwriting gained 
during prior prosecutions. Plainly, Ragan was already familiar 
with defendant's handwriting when she was asked to authenticate 
documents related to this case. Cf. People v. Cepeda. 851 F.2d 
1564, 1566-67 (9th Cir. 1988)(witness' familiarity with 
handwriting gained only after defendant indicted and for sole 
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purpose of testifying at trial constituted a "clear violation" of 
rule 901(b) (2)) . 
Even assuming arguendo that defendant's second argument had 
merit, his third contention -- that Ragan's familiarity with the 
remaining document is insufficient to allow her to authenticate 
the handwriting -- would fail. Without any analysis, defendant 
baldly asserts that "familiarity with one letter is insufficient 
under Freshwater and Rule 901 to render [Ragan] competent to 
render nonexpert opinion. . .." (Br. of App. at 14). 
Defendant's lack of any legal analysis is in itself a sufficient 
ground for refusing to consider this claim. State v. Amicone, 
689 P,2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
But, even on the merits, Freshwatex does not support 
defendant's interpretation of rule 901. In Freshwater, the court 
determined the threshold legal question of admissibility by 
holding that a witness who claimed to have seen defendant write 
once could testify that the letter she received was in his 
handwriting. The testimony then went to the jury, which was 
responsible for determining how much weight the testimony should 
be given and how much credibility to accord the witness, given 
the fact that the witness had seen defendant write only once. 
Freshwater, 85 P. at 448. 
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Thus, defendant's claim fails on the merits because he 
confuses the threshold issue of admissibility with the weight to 
be accorded evidence once the court has admitted it. See United 
States v. Binzel. 907 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1990)(citing Rinker 
v. United States. 151 F. 755 (8th Cir. 1907))(noting that once a 
"minimal factual basis'' for familiarity is presented, "the extent 
of the familiarity generally goes to the weight to be accorded 
the testimony, rather than to its admissibility"). All that is 
required for admissibility is familiarity sufficient to support a 
finding that the evidence is what the witness claims it to be. 
State v. Purcell. 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985). "The rule 
requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof 
has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in 
favor of authenticity or identification. The rest is up to the 
jury." 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence § 901(a) [01] at 901-19 (1994). That is, once the court 
admits the evidence, it is the jury's job to weigh that evidence 
and determine its credibility. Thus, in this case, the number of 
documents that Ragan authenticated would go to the weight of the 
evidence, not to its admissibility. 
In this case, the trial court correctly interpreted and 
applied rule 901(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In 
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addition, the court's findings underlying its legal determination 
are well-supported by the record evidence.5 For these reasons, 
the trial court's decision to allow Sherry Ragan to testify as a 
non-expert witness whose familiarity with defendant's handwriting 
was not acquired for purposes of this litigation should remain 
undisturbed. 
POINT TWQ 
THE EVIDENCE AND INFERENCES THAT MAY 
REASONABLY BE DRAWN FROM IT AMPLY SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE 
INDIVIDUAL WHO UTTERED THE FORGED 
PRESCRIPTION 
Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient 
to convict him of uttering a forged prescription. Specifically, 
he argues that the State "failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was the person who did make or utter a forged 
prescription" (Br. of App. at 17-18). 
In order to reverse a criminal conviction based on a jury 
verdict for insufficient evidence, this Court must determine that 
5
 Even if the trial court erred in allowing Ragan to 
authenticate the documents, the error was harmless. See, e.g. 
State v. Purcell. 711 P.2d at 244-45; Utah R. Evid. 103(a). The 
handwriting expert compared the Percocet prescription not only to 
the authenticated documents to which defendant objected, but also 
to the disguised court-ordered sample, concluding that the court-
ordered sample was positively written by the same hand as the 
forged prescription (Tr. at 134, 148) . 
15 
the evidence was xvso inconclusive or so inherently improbable 
that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt' 
that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Goddard. 871 
P.2d at 543. 
Defendant cites three facts that he believes must 
necessarily have created a reasonable doubt that defendant was 
the person who uttered the check: first, that Dr. Kim Bateman, 
who provided the only direct identification of defendant, 
identified him merely as a patient he had seen on September 26, 
1994; second, that two pharmacy employees who saw the person in 
the pharmacy (one of whom also saw him drive off in a red sports 
car) only identified him as a ublack man"; and, third, that no 
one saw defendant take a prescription pad from a clinic (Br. of 
App. at 18).6 
In essence, defendant's argument is that there was no direct 
proof that defendant was the person who took the prescription 
form and later uttered the forged prescription. Direct proof, 
6
 In addition, with no authority whatsoever and directly 
contrary to the expert's record testimony, defendant asserts that 
the expert's "testimony that the prescription and the handwriting 
sample had 18-20 points of common identity is insufficient to 
establish identification" (Br. of App. at 18). Plainly, this 
Court need not even consider statements unsupported by either law 
and fact. State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah App. 1989). 
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however, is not necessary to convict an individual of a crime. 
The law is well-settled that "circumstantial evidence alone may 
be competent to establish the guilt of the accused." State v. 
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983), superseded on other 
grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, there was overwhelming evidence from which a 
jury could reasonably infer that defendant was the person who 
uttered the forged prescription. See Sentencing Hearing of 
4/1/95 at 39-45). The State presented evidence that prescription 
pads were routinely left in clinic examination rooms, that a 
clinic doctor examined defendant in one of these rooms the day 
before the prescription was tendered, that defendant was left 
unattended in the room prior to the examination, and that the 
doctor whose signature appeared on the prescription never signed 
or authorized anyone else to sign the prescription for him (Tr. 
29, 32, 69, 70, 72, 73). A reasonable inference from this 
sequence of facts is that defendant had the opportunity to take a 
blank prescription form from the room. 
Two pharmacy employees testified at trial that a black man 
tendered the forged prescription at the pharmacy (Tr. 44, 49). 
One employee testified that he saw the same man drive off in a 
compact, cherry red sports car that resembled photos of the 
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compact, cherry red sports car owned by defendant (Tr. 49-50). A 
reasonable inference from this testimony is that defendant may 
have been the individual who tendered the prescription. 
A handwriting expert compared in detail the forged 
prescription with letters and an envelope written by defendant, 
finding 32 distinct handwriting "points of identification" in the 
forged prescription which were also present in the other 
documents (Tr. 124, 131). He testified that 10-20 points of 
identification were needed for a highly probable or positive 
identification, and positively stated that defendant wrote the 
prescription (Tr. 116-17) . 
The expert also reviewed the court-ordered sample produced 
by defendant prior to trial. He testified that although 
defendant had tried to falsify and disguise his handwriting in 
the sample, he was still able to locate 18-20 points of 
identification that matched the forged prescription (Tr. 133). 
Based on this analysis, he again opined that defendant wrote the 
prescription (Tr. 134). 
Under the circumstances, the facts upon which defendant 
relies for his assertion that reasonable doubt must have existed 
-- facts which the State does not dispute -- are simply 
insufficient to create the level of improbability necessary to 
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reverse a jury verdict. Indeed, in combination with other the 
other facts cited, they are incriminating. The single fact that 
no one saw defendant actually take the prescription form does not 
create reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming 
circumstantial evidence against defendant. In light of the 
appellate court policy affording "great deference" to jury 
verdicts, where, as here, there is "any evidence, including 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it," to support the 
jury's verdict, this Court's inquiry should end and the verdict 
should be affirmed. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for uttering a forged prescription. 
ORAL ARQUMENX 
The State does not request oral argument in this case. 
However, because of the paucity of state case law dealing with 
handwriting authenticated pursuant to rule 901(b)(2), a full 
written opinion would be helpful. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this o?*? day of February, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Provo, Utah 84601, this d^\ day of February, 1996. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Forged P r e s c r i p t i o n 
nm SANPETE VALLEY HOSPITAL and MEDICAL CLINICS 
Robert D. Armstong, M.D. 
DEA No. AA2726365 
Bruce Burnham, M.D. 
DEA No. AB7577844 
Jan C. Jonsofi, PA-C 
RiysiaaDu s^ggtant - Certified 
Darrel Oisen, M.D> 
So. B02467947 
Kim A Bateman, M.D. 
DEA No. AB6656409 
Gene £. Speakman, M.D. 
DEA No. AS1639826 
Age 
Address 2<ror 3r*is 9Q»K*> Mariti Family Clinic 
159 North Main 
Manrt, UT 84642 
835-9231 
£ p h r a i m Medical Clinic 
99 South Main 
Ephraim, UT 84627 
283-4076 
Moroni Medical Clinic 
394 East 100 South 
Moroni, UT 84646 
436-8271 
Mt. P l e a s a n t Family 
Heal th Center 
1100 South Medical Drive 
Mt Pleasant, UT 84647 
462-3471 
<?5 / 0^-6 « /fa*/ 
M.D 
Dispense as written Refill. .times PRN NR 
ADDENDUM B 
Cour t -o rdered Handwrit ing Sample 
Springville Police Dept. 
Springville, Utah 
>-l< 
^Time" 
r-JgflN 
S t m t Address 
City 
Place of Birth 
Date of Birth 
Height 
2C0 
Color of Eyes 
&%)U)N 
Piece of Employ men 
Occupation or Trade 
IV0M2 
Name of Neares 
Address 
t Re 
W R I T E - DO NOT 1 
A 0 C 
A B 
K L. 
K L 
u v 
_A___i> 
a b 
k 1 
U V 
1 2 
C 
M 
1/ 
V 
C 
ft 
m 
W 
3 
3 
JtfCQ 
Weight 
51 
U£ 
^ A k e ' 
Color of Hair 
t (or last employme 
ative 
9 R I N T - C 
D 
N 
, . . . . d -
d 
u~fc~ 
n 
J...A.. 
X 
1 
4 
APITAL 
E 
0 
O 
Y 
e 
o 
o 
y 
5 
HANDWRITING SPECIMEN 
JkW 
State 
Build 
Rignt or Left Handed 
ht ) 
ANC 
F 
.P. 
P 
4-
Z 
c 
f 
p 
2. 
z 
.J* 
6 
Social Security No. 
) SMALL 
G 
...A 
Q 
3 
9 
....<L 
q 
^ 
7 
Relation 
LETTERS 
H 
R 
V> 
h 
r 
3 
e 
A9« 
\ 
5 
S 
\ 
I 
s 
s 
<\ 
9 
j 
J 
T 
T 
J 
J 
t 
\0 
10 | 
Case No. 
Office 
\~~Arthur Bob Charles 
kvTUnr^V.C^KUBS | Don Edward Frank 
^c^xA^^^^vWL 
| George Henry Imig 
1 John Kenneth Lamb \ 
L W ^ Y ^ ^ ^ \_iWs\Q 
1 Mary Nan Olson 
MMLA W ^ ( V - ~ D ^ Paul Queniin Robert 
k^u\_(>Tv^rx\^ ^r^£c<er 
Samuel Tom Umphrey 
Vernon Will Xavier \ 
Yolanda Ziffman 
1234 N. East Ave., S.W. 
\ ^ V \ £-£cft f\.\i £ SNA 
5678 S. West Blvd., N.W. 
9012 E. North PI., S.E. 
3456 W. South St., N.E. \ 
M XU/ltv, 'jK'.fMg, ^ 7, 
Date 
Witnessed by / 
~~ Dale^itnessed V» 
The above is a specimen of my handwriting prepared freely e*d voluntarily. 
\§=J*5 n 
J * -
Signature 
Exemplars of (Print Name, First, Initial) 
Year Born Race Sex 
Springville Police Dept. 
Springville, Utah 
HANDWRITING SPECIMEN 
THE MONTHS OF THE YEAR 
January ,W\KV3A V May fy/W 
fecsCOfrfro 
V 
February 
M a r c h J M v ^ 
April / \ < X N V -
^c 
June 
Julyc\'V-M 
V 
Auouat KvH>\>SX 
WRITE THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS 
4321 
S\ —, £_ 
8675_ikjJ_Q 8237 
page 2 
4679 ^ VV\ 
S e p t e m b e r ^ S ^ i i S ^ S ^ S -
o c t o b ^ 3 S i £ ^ 2 = _ _ 
December i t C x I l ^ ^ ^ 
0 0 1 0 W V ^ \ * ^ 
"A^VA 8453. Q\\<^ 5583. 5^1^ <.o 
7197. 7\c\n 8076. ^ A U 5814 *5^M 1585 V=rA b 
SPELL OUT THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS 
One. 
Two 
t^v^. 
* , \ ^ 
Three v v x*~~- ~-'" 
Four 
Six. 
<=^ \ 
r \ U ^ 
"\V^c\V^ 
'N\\^\\^\\c^ 
Seven >-/ '—X 'T^-V' 
Eight ^ L ^ ^ A . 
N i n e ^ V v ^ ^ _ 
T e n 3 ^ ^ _ 
Eleven 2 ^ -V^\ -^\U 
Twelve 
Sixty 
Fifteen V \ v 
Twenty \ 
X^r-L_\ V 
Thirtftftn \ V \ \ ^ J A \ - <r. v^-
F o r t y ^ ^ S ^ L 
Thirty. 
-V 
o 
• > , \ 
_^_ ^ 
fe^c.Xo ^ 
Signature 
s 
Witnessed by 
Vw. VtK/,/^^-\P'^fo 
less  
OSf* Wltncsxo J^_ 
ADDENDUM C 
Au then t i ca t ed Documents 
,M *-
 Y fhl7>e
'
/rr ^m Dfivk) c*t€ 
ft CetnCfit- T/M£ FficTtL. 
,„l ll„U,,l,ll„ll„„IU.II.H.II,M,M„IUII,n!nM 
1
 "' # 
~7n 2)£f cny drro/evzy Cat/Any 2MI//2> ^OUT 
you( 7frgrC//OLun: couttr 7ZAA)s&e/pF OF TH^ Dm:m 
jLMyzgZsrnvzf 7W/rr7H&Cd7&f£rtX/<rr /lc~£itMu£/n&s 
Ak&MtofilABLG' 2>£F&d&£ 6Jrra THE'Cou€irTZ*ts!SC&A&. 
J)z£^£ki£fac ^ - ^ - f y 
CL. 

